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Abstract. The notion of artificial institution is crucial for the specification of
open and dynamic interaction frameworks where heterogeneous and autonomous
agents can interact to face problems in various fields, like for instance electronic
commerce, business-to-business (B2B) applications, and personal assistant ap-
plications. In our view the specification of artificial institutions requires a clear
standard definition of some basic concepts: the notion of ontology, authoriza-
tions, conventions, and norms. In this paper we propose an operational approach
to the definition of norms that is mainly based on the generation of commitments.
These norms can be employed to verify if the interacting agents are behaving in
accordance with the normative specification of the system. In particular we regard
norms as event-driven rules that are fired by events happening in the system and
then modify commitments affecting the agents having a certain role. We will dis-
cuss the crucial differences between the notion of authorization and permission
and how the notion of permissions, obligations, and prohibitions can be expressed
in our model. We will investigate the connections among the specification of dif-
ferent artificial institutions, in particular how an institution can enrich or further
regulate the entities defined in another one. Finally we will briefly present the
specification of the Dutch Auction Institution and of the Auction House Institu-
tion in order to exemplify the model presented in this paper.
1 Introduction
The definition and representation of norms and their actual specification is a funda-
mental component of the formalization of every open and dynamic interaction system
[14, 21], that is, a system where heterogeneous and autonomous agents enter and leave
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dynamically. In such systems norms play a crucial role because they: (i) regulate the
behavior of agents, and (ii) create expectations on the behavior of other agents.
In open systems, norms can be analyzed and used from two different points of view:
the design of autonomous agents and the design of interaction systems. From the first
perspective norms have to be objectively expressed and external (with respect to the
internal structure of agents). Moreover, the model used to represent norms has to enable
agents to decide whether to fulfill them on the basis of their own goals [15, 13]. From
the second perspective norms can be used to verify if agents are correctly behaving,
even if, given that agent are autonomous, norms are not sufficient to prevent undesirable
behavior. In case of violation of a norm, the authority regulating the interaction system
may apply sanctions against the misbehaving agent [7, 21].
In the literature, it is possible to find numerous attempts to specify norms using
deontic logic [5] or predicate logic [7, 13], but they have a limited expressiveness; for
example they are not able to deal with time, a crucial aspect in normative systems.
Finally there are some works, closer to our approach, where norms specify actions to
be performed if certain preconditions are satisfied [14, 21].
In this paper we propose an operational approach to the specification of norms based
on the notion of social commitment, that is, on a concept whose use in the specification
of agent communication is becoming increasingly common [6, 8]. Thus an important
advantage of our approach is its coherence with an existing specification of an Agent
Communication Language (ACL). An agent able to reason on commitments would, as
consequence, be able to reason both on the effects of communicative acts and on norms
defined within a system. A crucial property of our approach is the possibility to verify if
one or more agents have violated the norms of the system. That is, it is possible to keep
trace of the commitments generated by the activation of norms for all the agents having
some role in the system. By identifying the violations of commitments it is possible to
detect the violation of the associated norm.
Finally, following our approach to norms it is possible for an artificial agent to
reason on its own actions and to have expectations on the actions of other agents. In
fact, it is possible to foresee which norms will be activated by the performance of an
action. For example, an agent can decide whether to bid or not to bid in an auction,
reasoning on the fact that its bid will activate a norm creating a commitment for the
bidder to pay a given amount of money (see Section 5).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 our view of the main components
necessary for the specification of artificial institutions is presented. Among those com-
ponents norms play a crucial role; our operational model of norms based on commit-
ments is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4 the connections among the specifications
of different artificial institutions are investigated and in Section 5 our model is clarified
through an example. Finally in Section 6 we draw some conclusions and delineate some
directions for future work.
2 Artificial Institutions
Artificial institutions are a software model, inspired by human institutions [18], used
as technological extension of human society. They can be employed to perform, by
means of artificial agents, certain computational intensive tasks such as: establishing
appointments, signing contracts, and carrying out commercial transactions for example
by means of an auction. As will be also shown in Section 5 a concrete open interac-
tion framework for heterogeneous agents is the result of the reification of the abstract
specification of a set of artificial institutions.
Given that the system has to be open, that is, heterogeneous agents made by different
designers may enter and leave the system dynamically, it makes crucial that the concepts
used for its specification have to be clearly and unambiguously defined and commonly
accepted as a standard by all agent designers.
In our view, the specification of an artificial institution consists of the following
components [10]:
– the core ontology, that is, the definitions of the institutional concepts introduced by
the institution and of the institutional actions that operate on them;
– a set of authorizations specifying which agents are authorized to perform the insti-
tutional actions;
– a set of conventions for the concrete performance of institutional actions;
– a set of norms that impose obligations, prohibitions and permissions for the agents
that interact within the institution.
2.1 The core ontology
The context within which artificial agents operate can be modelled as consisting of a
set of entities that can have both natural and institutional attributes, that is, attributes
that exist only thanks to the common agreement of the interacting agents. For example,
the size of a book is a natural attribute, while its price and its owner are institutional
attributes.
Institutional attributes can be changed by particular types of actions: institutional
actions. Therefore, agents cannot perform such actions by exploiting causal links oc-
curring in the natural world, as it would be done to open a door. Rather institutional
actions are performed on the basis of conventions on the exchange of messages.
We define institutional actions by specifying:
– an action name followed by a possibly empty list of parameters: iaction(param);
– a possibly empty set of (ontological) preconditions, which specify the values that
certain institutional attributes must have;
– a nonempty set of postconditions, which specify the values of certain institutional
attributes after a successful performance of the action.
2.2 Authorizations and Conventions
Institutional actions are performed by exchanging messages. To specify what kind of
message implements a specific institutional action we define conventions in the follow-
ing form:
exchMsg(msg type, sender, receivers, content) =conv iaction(param)
By itself, a convention is not sufficient to guarantee the successful performance
of an institutional action by the exchange of the appropriate message: indeed, some
additional conditions must be satisfied.
Conditions on the sender of the message. In general, an agent must be authorized
to perform an institutional action; for example, only the auctioneer can open an auction
by sending a suitable message to the participants. Moreover an authorization typically
holds if certain conditions about the state of the system, expressed by suitable Boolean
expressions, are satisfied. For example, it may be established that an auction is validly
opened only if there are at least two participants. Assuming that every agent in the
interaction system has an identifier (agent id), authorizations will be represented with
the following notation:
Auth(agent id, iaction(param), conditions)
In the specification of an interaction system it is useful to express authorizations in
term of the roles filled by agents, in order to abstract from the concrete agents that are
actually involved in an interaction. For example, the authorization to open and close
an auction is granted to the agent that fills the role of the auctioneer, independently of
its individual identity. Usually roles are defined relative to an institutional entity, for
example the role of participants and auctioneer are defined relative to the auction enti-
tity. We can then abstractly define the authorization to perform a specific institutional
action (with given parameters) associating it to a role defined in the context of a specific
institutional entity (ientity):
Auth(ientity.role, iaction(param), conditions)
In a concrete interaction, the authorizations associated to roles need to be trans-
formed into authorizations of an actual agent in the system. Such transformation can
be obtained searching among all the institutional entities in the system the ones that
match the description given through the parameters of the institutional action, and then
creating a concrete authorization for each agent having the role indicated in the abstract
authorization.
Conditions about the receivers of the message. Messages realizing institutional
actions should be received by all agents that are affected by the performance of the act.
For example, in the case of an institutional action of auction opening, all the participants
have to be the receivers of the message.
Conditions about the state of the system. In general, the exchange of a conven-
tional message successfully performs the associated institutional action only if certain
conditions on the state of the system are satisfied.
3 Norms
The execution of institutional actions by an authorized agent often needs to be regu-
lated by a system of norms imposing which actions should or should not be performed.
When an agent is planning its following action, it has to consider whether to satisfy
the constraints imposed by norms defined in the interaction systems by different insti-
tutions. For example, in our formalization of the Dutch Auction the auctioneer not only
is authorized to declare a price for the good on sale, but it is also obliged to declare a
price lower than the previous one or to close the auction. At the same time, a norm of
the Auction House forbids to the auctioneer to declare a price lower than a reservation
price.
Norms allow us to describe the expected behavior of the interacting agent from an
external point of view. In doing so, norms play an important role in a multi-agent sys-
tem, in that they make an agent’s behavior at least partially predictable and allow agents
to coordinate and plan their actions according to the expected behavior of the others, as
studied in [16, 1]. In our framework such desired behavior is expressed through a set of
commitments that represent the obligations and prohibitions of agents created or can-
celled by norms. Before presenting our formalization of norms, we need to introduce
the concepts of commitment and how we describe events occurring in a multi-agent
system.
3.1 Commitments
In this paper we give only a short description of our model of commitment, which
is assumed to be the fundamental entity of what we call the Basic Institution. For a
complete treatment see [10, 4].
We regard a commitment as an entity with the following attributes: a debtor, a cred-
itor, a content, and a state, used to keep track of the temporal evolution of the commit-
ment. Commitments are represented with the following notation:
Comm(state, debtor, creditor, content)
The content of a commitment is represented by means of a temporal proposition (for
a detailed treatment see [9, 4]). At every time instant, a temporal proposition has a truth
value, which can be undefined, true, or false. When the content of a commitment is no
longer undefined, as a consequence of the occurrence of a domain event, the state of that
commitment is automatically set to fulfilled if the content has become true, otherwise it
is set to violated.
In our framework every agent is authorized to create a commitment by perform-
ing the makeCommitment institutional action, whose successful performance creates an
unset commitment. The debtor of an unset commitment may refuse it by executing set-
Cancel, or it may undertake the proposed commitment by executing setPending. We
represent a refused commitment by means of the cancelled state, whereas an accepted
commitment is depicted with the pending state. The creditor of pending or unset com-
mitment can always set it to cancelled. Another institutional action, used in the example
in Section 5, is makePendingComm, which creates a pending commitment and whose
execution coincides with the sequential execution of makeCommitment and setPending.
Summarizing, commitments undergo the life cycle described in [8] by reacting ei-
ther to institutional actions performed by agents or to domain-dependent events, which
modify the state of temporal propositions.
3.2 Events
As we will see, norms are event-driven rules that when are fired by events happening in
the system modify commitments affecting the agents having a certain role. The Unified
Modeling Language (UML) [2] models four kinds of events: signals, calls, passing of
time and change in state. Inspired by UML notation for signals, here we propose to
model type of events as stereotyped classes.
We represent events as entities of the system having attributes that provide informa-
tion about the state transition that caused it. Moreover we assume that the system returns
the time at which an event token has occurred, by means of the time of() operator. In
our formalization we have singled out three main categories of events:
– a TimeEvent, that occurs when the system reaches a certain instant of time;
– a ChangeEvent, that happens when an institutional entity changes in some way.
This kind of event type can be specialized further:
• an InstitutionalPropertyChange, registered when an attribute has changed its
value;
• an InstitutionalRelationChange, occurring when a new relation is created or an
existing one between the institutional entity and another one is dropped;
• an InstitutionalStateChange, occurring when an entity modifies its type in a
given taxonomy (e.g., when an auction from unset becomes open);
– an ActionEvent, that happens when an agent perform an action (an interesting type
of this kind of events is ExchangeMessage, that represents the act of sending a
message).
The definition of event types allows us to describe event templates, that are, event
types with some restrictions on certain attributes that describe a set of possible event oc-
currences. Event templates are used in the on section of a norm: when an event matches
the given descriptor, the corresponding norm is fired and its variable e is filled with the
event that activated it.
Such a description can be straightforwardly transformed in a specification based
on preconditions and post-conditions, that is, a description of the state of the system
before and after the event has happened. The possibility to specify events through pre-
conditions and post-conditions is crucial for artificial agents to reason on whether the
performance of a certain action makes an event happen. Therefore, an agent is able to
infer which norms will be activated by performing an action, which is an important
property of a system of norms.
3.3 The definition of norms
We regard norms as event-driven rules that create or cancel commitments affecting a
set of agents that enact a specified role within the institution. At an abstract level, a
norm is part of the definition of an artificial institution; its instances then regulate and
are bounded by the organization that reifies the institution. When an agent fills a role
in an institution, we assume that it accepts that norms create commitments binding
the agent to a pseudo-agent representing the institution, which we call an institutional
agent. Such agent allows us to keep trace of commitments created by a certain instance
of institution, which also means that commitments created by norm of an institution
can be canceled only by norms defined by the same institution; this is because only
the creditor of a pending commitment can set it to cancelled [10]. Furthermore, if two
commitments are in conflict, an agent can decide which is more important with respect
to its own policy (see [13]) by reasoning about which institutional agents have created
such commitments.
A norm is defined within an institution, observes an entity of an institution and is
activated by an event concerning such an entity. Typically, interesting event types are
not only communicative acts like in [21], but also the filling of a role by an agent, a
value change of an institutional attribute, the reaching of certain instant of time, and so
on.
When a norm is activated, if certain contextual conditions are met, it is applied to
a collection of liable agents, which are described by a suitable selection expression;
in general, the collection of liable agents corresponds to the set of agents that play a
given role in the institution. For every liable agent, the norm creates or cancels a set of
commitments of the agent toward the institutional agent.
The general structure of a norm can be described as follows:
within context name: ientity
on e: event type
if contextual conditions then
foreach agent in liable agent selection expression
do {commitmentActionDescription(agent, inst agent, parameters)}+
In an open multi-agent system by themselves norms are not able to banish viola-
tions, because the sincerity and benevolence of agents are not guaranteed. This is be-
cause we do not assume that norms are constraints encoded in each agent as in [16] and
[1]. In fact, in our opinion agent designers can program their agents to violate norms if
they consider this as a means for the fulfillment of their goals. In open systems norms
should be used to indicate preferred path for the evolution of the system and to detect
violation of commitments created by norms. In this respect, our point of view is close
to [15] and [21], where no assumptions are made about the internal structure of agents.
Using norms, institutions can regulate in an uniform way both the communication
protocol and protocol-independent normative aspects, like for instance the fulfillment
of agreements made during the interaction. Norms can be used to specify protocols, be-
cause they can dictate that in certain circumstances an agent ought to send a given type
of message, or react to a message in a specific way. At the same time, norms can for-
bid the execution of institutional actions, in particular communicative acts, even if they
are authorized. Furthermore, in correspondence of events that conclude the interaction
process, norms can instantiate commitments to noncommunicative actions, like the pay-
ment of the purchased goods at the price negotiated during the interaction. Examples of
these types of norms will be discussed in Section 5.
Many studies have been devoted to the analysis of the relationship holding between
norms and commitments. For example in [14] commitments are defined as a specializa-
tion of norms, while in [3] and [19] norms are a special kind of commitments, called
metacommitments.
From our point of view, norms are not themselves commitments, but rules that ma-
nipulate commitments of the agents engaged in an interaction. In fact, norms are as-
sociated to roles rather than to individual agents, and strictly speaking they cannot be
fulfilled or violated. Indeed, what can be fulfilled or violated is not a norm, but rather a
commitment created by the application of a norm.
By creating a new commitment whenever a norm is applied, we can compute how
many times a norm has been violated or fulfilled by counting how many commitments
instantiated by that norm are violated or fulfilled. This is important because we consider
that a normative system should allow one to detect not only the presence of violations,
but also how often they occur.
3.4 Obligations, Permissions, Prohibitions and Authorizations
In our framework commitments are used to represent all deontic relationships between
agents, including as a special case the deontic relationships undertaken by the debtor
through communicative acts [10]. In particular, commitments toward institutional agents
are used to represent obligations and prohibitions. In general, we perceive obligations
and prohibitions as commitments undertaken by an agent enacting a role within an in-
stitution, toward the institution itself; more precisely, obligations are commitments to
perform an action of a given type, and prohibitions are commitments not to perform
an action of a given type. Furthermore, we interpret the absence of positive or negative
commitments to the execution of an action of a given type as permissions.
Usually in agent literature the concept of authorization is not distinguished from
permission or the former encompasses the latter [5]. Coherently with the concept of
institutionalized power of [12], we distinguish between the notions of authorization and
permission. The main difference between authorization and permission resides in the
effects of the action. Whereas the former represents a necessary condition for the exe-
cution of institutional action, permission represents the need to regulate the performance
of authorized actions, but it cannot prevent the effects deriving from the performance
of a forbidden act.
Summarizing, an agent’s commitments can be of two types: those undertaken by
the agent through the performance of communicative acts (see [10]) and those imposed
to the agent by norms in virtue of the agent’s roles in an institution.
4 Connections among different Artificial Institutions
In this section we discuss what relations can exist among different artificial institutions
constituting an interaction system. We envision that when a designer starts to specify a
new artificial institution, there is at his or her disposal a library of previously defined
institutions that can be used to generate a new one. Therefore, interrelations among
artificial institutions are crucial to define a modular and incremental specification of
new institutions.
In general, an artificial institution can enrich with new institutional attributes the de-
scription of entities defined by ontologies pertaining to other institutions. For instance,
as we will see in the example reported in Section 5, the Dutch Auction defines a cur-
rent price relative to a product on sale during an auction, while, at the same time, the
Auction House associates to the same product a reservation price agreed with the owner
of the product. Given that institutional facts exist only thanks to common agreement,
attributes described in different institutions exist only within the scope of the defining
institution. When another institution enriches an ontology with new attributes, they do
not modify the previous specification. Because agents involved by the former institu-
tion might not participate in the second, and thus might not access such attributes, new
attributes will be recognized only by those agents filling a role in the new institution.
A second interesting relationship existing among two different institutions regards
norms. Whereas a norm can regulate institutional actions described by any institution,
its set of liable agents can be constituted only by agents enacting a role in the same
institution that defines the norm. Given that agents can fill roles pertaining to several
institutions, a norm can affect agent behavior within other institution by creating obli-
gations and prohibitions for a role of that institution to execute an action defined by
another institution.
We perceive the distinction between authorization and permission as fundamental,
because authorizations and permissions (i.e., the absence of prohibitions) might be rel-
ative to different sources. In fact, even if an action is authorized by an institution, the
performance of such an action might be forbidden to an authorized agent by another
institution. In this case, the agent has the necessary institutional power, but it is not
permitted to perform that action by the second institution. If it executes such action, its
effects take place, but the agent violates a commitment.
The interaction of norms might raise conflicts between obligations and prohibitions
imposed by different institutions. At runtime, when an agent has contrasting obligations
and prohibitions, it can reason about which is less expensive to violate, usually consid-
ering from what institution each commitment stems from. More research is needed to
develop methods able to ensure that the specifications defined by different institutions
do not raise conflicts. Further research is also needed to provide a general method for
an institution to enlarge the set of authorizations defined by another institution.
5 An example: the Dutch auction
In this section we will present two examples of artificial institutions in order to exem-
plify how norms are specified in our framework. This allows us to show how different
institutions interact and to clarify the distinction between authorizations and permis-
sions. To this purpose, we shall present our formalizations of the Dutch Auction and of
the Auction House holding auctions regulated by the former institution. Due to space
limitations, we report a simplified version of our specifications, focusing our attention
only on those aspects involved in fixing the price of the product on sale.
The main advantage of our formalization with respect to the one specified by FIPA
[11] is that, due to the explicit representation of norms as rules that modify agent com-
mitments, it is possible to model in an uniform way the interaction protocols and the
other rules that regulate the interaction framework. Furthermore, when an interaction
terminates successfully, agents are explicitly committed by suitable norms to carry out
the economic transaction.
5.1 The Dutch Auction Institution
During a Dutch Auction an auctioneer tries to fix the price of goods. For the sake of
simplicity, here we assume that goods cannot be split. An agent taking part in a Dutch
Auction can fill the role of participant, auctioneer or transaction agent, the agent that
attends to the exchange of money and goods when a price has been accepted. During an
auction we assume that a participant cannot be the auctioneer or the transaction agent,
while an auctioneer might also fill the role of transaction agent.
After a period of time reserved to the registration of participants, the interaction
starts when the start time has elapsed and the auctioneer has declared the auction open.
Then, the price of the product on sale is initialized, usually higher than the expected
final result. We assume that when a new price is declared, during the validity of such
price, the auctioneer declares as the winner the first participant that accepts the current
price, and then closes the auction. Otherwise, after the time of validity has elapsed, the
auctioneer should declare a new current price, lower than the previous one, or close the
auction.
The ontology of the Dutch Auction is described by the class diagram reported in
Figure 1, where concepts like Agent and Product are assumed to be defined by external
ontologies. It is important to observe that the current price is defined relative to the
Product, which means that the ontology enriches the definition of such an entity by
adding a new institutional attribute recognized by the agents involved in the current
interaction.
-startTime
-id
-transactionTime
-priceValidity
DutchAuction
ClosedDA
-agentIdentifier
Agent
0..1
*
auctioneer
0..1
*
winner
Product
-price
CurPrice
0..1
0..1
0..1
*
transaction-agent
OpenDA
*
1
on-sale
-accept_price=false
Participant
* *
Fig. 1. The Dutch Auction Ontology.
The Dutch Auction ontology also defines a set of institutional actions that allow
agents to operate on such institutional entities. For the sake of brevity, we report only
the complete specification of the institutional action that sets the current price, where
preconditions and effects are described using Object Constraint Language (OCL)[17].
We assume that the price of a Dutch Auction can be changed only if the auction is open
and the previous price is higher than the new one, which becomes the current price of
the auction.
name : setCurPrice(a id, p)
pre : OpenDA.allInstances→ exists(id = a id and currentPrice.price > p)
post : OpenDA.allInstances→ exists(id = a id and currentPrice.price = p)
The Dutch Auction Institution defines a set of authorizations for the performance
of institutional actions. Some of these authorizations are conditional: for example an
auctioneer is authorized to open an auction only if its start time has elapsed and if there
are at least two agents registered as participants. Here we report only the authorization
that allows the auctioneer of a given auction to perform the setCurPrice institutional
action.
Auth(DutchAuctionid.auctioneer, setCurPrice(id, p))
The behavior of agents that have joined an interaction system regulated by the Dutch
Auction Institution is constrained by a normative system, which prescribes what agents
should or should not do in correspondence to relevant institutional events. Likewise
[10], we have defined a set of norms that regulate both the communicative acts per-
formed by agents and the final exchange of good and money between the transaction
agent and the winnerof the auction. Here we report an example of a norm that is acti-
vated when an agent is declared to be the winner and creates a commitment for such an
agent to pay a given amount of money to the transaction agent. Let us denote the insti-
tutional agent by the DutInstAgent identifier. Then, the formalization of such a norm is
as follows.
within a: OpenDA
on e: InstitutionalRelationChange(a,winner, created)
if true then
foreach agent in a.winner
do
makePendingComm(agent,DutInstAgent,
(give(agent, a.transaction agent, a.curPrice.price),
< now, now + a.transactionT ime >,∃))
A similar norm commits the transaction agent, toward the Institution, to transfer the
ownership of the product on sale to the winner of the auction.
5.2 The Auction House Institution
The Auction House is an institution constituted by a set of employee agents, holding
several auctions and regulating the commercial relation with the owner of the prod-
uct on sale. The Auction House defines only one role, employee, that allows agents to
fill both the roles of auctioneer and transaction agent, while the owner role, together
with Product, is imported by external ontologies. In Figure 2 we report a class diagram
representing the ontology defined by the Auction House.
In order to obtain simpler and shorter OCL expressions, in this paper we will assume
that an Auction House runs at most one Dutch Auction. When an agent decides to sell a
product trough an auction, it reaches an agreement with the Auction House concerning
the minimum price at which the product may be sold. Such an institutional fact does not
require the agreement of the participants: in fact, participants are not even assumed to
know about the existence of a reservation price (not to mention its actual value current
value). We regard reservation price as an institutional attribute associated to the product
and representing a private agreement established between the Auction House and the
owner of the product on sale.
DutchAuctionAuctionHouse
Product
-agentIdentifier
Agent
* 0..1
employee
*
1
owner
-reservationPrice
-decrement
Agreement
0..1
0..1
1 0..1
holds
Fig. 2. The Auction House Ontology.
A norm of the Auction House is related to the agreement stipulated between the
owner of the good and the auction house and is activated when an employee becomes
the auctioneer. This norm commits the auctioneer to not declare a price lower than
agreed reservation price.
within ah: AuctionHouse
on e: InstitutionalRelationChange(ah.DutchAuction, auctioneer, created)
if true then
foreach agent in ah.employee→ select(
emp | e.involved→ contains(emp))
do
makePendingComm(agent,DutInstAgent(not setCurPrice(a.id, ?p)
[?p > ah.agreement.reservationPrice], < now,now + time of(e1 :
InstitutionalStateChange(ah.dutchAuction,OpenDA,ClosedDA)) >,∀))
This norm constrains the auctioneer’s behavior by imposing that the current price
cannot be lower than the reservation price, although any price would be legal from the
point of view of the Dutch Auction. In fact, the Dutch Auction authorizes the auction-
eer to set a new current price, imposing through the ontological preconditions of the
setCurPrice that it should be lower than the previous one, but not further constrains are
imposed. This example shows clearly that authorizations and permissions may differ
when they are relative to different sources.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a model for the specification of artificial institutions.
In particular, we have focused on an operational definition of norms as event-driven
rules that modify agent commitments. In doing so, we have discussed the fundamental
role played by norms, which allow us to express obligations and prohibitions in terms
of commitments. Indeed, norms can represent in a unified way both interaction pro-
tocols and other normative aspects. Finally we have shown, through an example, how
an interaction system can be specified in terms of norms defined by different artificial
institutions. In particular, we have discussed how a designer may define a new interac-
tion framework by using several artificial institutions and what connections might exist
between them.
Several research questions are still open, and will be tackled in our future work.
In particular, we are interested in developing methods for discovering inconsistencies
among different artificial institutions. This point is particularly useful to develop tools
supporting the generation of new institutions by reusing previously defined institutions.
In particular, we are interested in verifying during the specification phase whether
norms may create obligations to perform unauthorized actions, or under what condi-
tions two norms may generate conflicting commitments. Finally, we plan to devise an
explicit representation of the sanctions connected to the violation of a commitment.
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